Hugh Ellis, Director of Policy and Celia Davis, Senior Projects and Policy Manager at the TCPA
The planning system is a vital protection against the rapidly increasing risk of flooding, but the policy approach to managing flood risk in England is being fatally undermined.
The TCPA is concerned by two recent appeal decisions that have allowed large housing developments in areas of tidal flood risk, despite their failure to pass the sequential test – a test which is supposed to act as the key safeguard to direct development away from high flood risk areas.
The sequential test is supposed to act as the key safeguard to direct development away from high flood risk areas.
But worryingly, through updates to the Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) published last week, the government have responded not with a strengthening of flood risk policy, but a further weakening of the sequential test.
The government have responded, not with a strengthening of flood risk policy, but a further weakening of the sequential test.
There are two aspects of these changes that cause concern. The first is that the sequential test can now be disapplied for applications that are subject to surface water flood risk. The second is that the PPG now advises that housing land supply ‘may be relevant in the planning balance, alongside the sequential test.’
The change in approach to surface water flooding is not unexpected following vocal lobbying from housebuilders, and the TCPA is not unsympathetic to the need for a proportionate approach that reflects the level of flood risk at specific sites. But exempting the consideration of surface water flood risk – which is the most rapidly increasing source of flooding due to climate change – in determining the suitability of a site for housing development, is dangerously short sighted.
Exempting the consideration of surface water flood risk in determining the suitability of a site for housing development, is dangerously short sighted.
It is particularly ill advised in the context of the failure of successive governments to enact Schedule 3 of the Flood and Water Management Act – an issue this government has been silent on for over a year. This means there is no legal requirement to deliver sustainable drainage on new development and no effective oversight to make sure SuDS are implemented and well maintained. This is resulting in poor implementation of flood mitigations on some development sites, which in turn further undermines public trust in the planning system.
As for the new wording on housing land supply, this is a prime example of poor policy making. The text supports the flawed position taken by inspectors in recent appeals that have reduced the weight of all types of flood risk to a material consideration within the planning balance, rather than applying it as a pass or fail gateway test. It opens space for negotiation on a policy that we believe should act as a fundamental safeguard against flooding. The intention of the footnote 7 of the NPPF is to exempt areas of flood risk from the presumption in favour of development. When two thirds of planning authorities are unable to demonstrate a five-year housing land supply, leeway for decision makers to undermine the footnote is irresponsible and puts people at risk.
The result is to undermine the status of flood risk in the planning balance, and to push consideration of the sequential test to the site level. This fatally compromises its core objective, which is to favour the most flood-resilient locations for development – a crucial policy driver intended to keep communities safe. Without this, full emphasis rests on mitigation measures, which will always carry serious residual risks, such as reliance on evacuation.
[The change to] planning policy is a move designed to respond to the concerns of land promoters and housebuilders quickly, while avoiding any need to consult with either expert advice or the homeowners who will ultimately pay the price.
Using the PPG to make fundamental changes to planning policy is a move designed to respond to the concerns of land promoters and housebuilders quickly while avoiding any need to consult with either expert advice or the homeowners who will ultimately pay the price. But those arguing for changes should be careful what they wish for because this incremental weakening of the sequential test means we are left with a planning system that cannot defend the public interest.
Overall, we now find ourselves in a perverse situation where a deepening climate crisis is being met by a weakening of the policies intended to protect us from its impacts.
The economic damage of new homes becoming uninsurable due to weak flood risk policy will far outweigh any short-term economic gain from new permissions. The reality is that we all benefit from a robust approach to the radically increasing risks of climate change.
For more detailed analysis on the implications of recent planning appeals on flood risk policy see our briefing note here: A dangerous precedent for flood risk policy
